2026 Financial Services Report:
The Dual Storm of Ransomware and Vendor Ecosystem Risk
By the Black Kite Research Group™
2026 Financial Services Report:
The Dual Storm of Ransomware and Vendor Ecosystem Risk
By the Black Kite Research Group™
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ransomware and Supply Chain Risk in Financial Services
The threat to financial institutions no longer comes from a single direction.
Direct ransomware attacks on the financial sector are rising again, but this is only one of the two pressures the industry now faces.
The second is structural and harder to see in headline incident counts: supply chain risk. The vendor ecosystem on which financial institutions depend has grown measurably more vulnerable in the past year.
Scope of Vendor Risk Analysis
The Black Kite Research Group™ analyzed three vendor populations:
The Top
vendors most relied upon by financial institutions
The
vendors whose client base is meaningfully concentrated in finance
A representative sample set of more than
vendors monitored by Black Kite's financial customers
Concurrent with the rise in direct attacks, the vendor ecosystem has grown measurably vulnerable.
Across the representative sample set, half carry critical vulnerabilities (CVSS ≥ 8) and a third carry actively exploited weaknesses listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.
The Breaking Point of Traditional Perimeter Defense
The traditional defense approach, which is built on the assumption that hardening the perimeter would secure the systems behind it, is breaking down. Investing in internal defenses does not shield a financial institution from the vulnerabilities carried by the vendors it depends on. The financial sector's defensive maturity is, in large part, a product of wide ranging regulations. The vendors serving the sector face no comparable pressure, and the gap between the two has become the most exploitable seam in the ecosystem.
A Pivot from Tactical Problem to Structural Crisis
Last year’s report documented a single, defining shift: direct ransomware attacks on the financial sector were declining, confirming that attackers had shifted their focus to the weaker third-party ecosystem.
The data in this 2026 report demonstrates that this reprieve has ended. Direct attacks are rising again and are occurring concurrently with a massive escalation of vendor vulnerabilities, moving the industry from a single-direction tactical problem to a two-front structural crisis.
This report explores how direct attacks and supply chain risk are now rising together. The old mental model of "strong banks, weak vendors" no longer captures the full picture.
Key Takeaways
1. Ransomware Returns to Finance
Direct ransomware attacks on financial institutions resumed their upward trajectory in 2025 after a brief decline the year before. Reported incidents rose from 156 in 2024 to 202 in 2025, a 30% increase that reversed the gains of the previous year and signaled the end of finance's short defensive reprieve. Early 2026 data points to further acceleration: 65 incidents recorded in the first quarter alone, exceeding Q1 2025 by 76%.
Ransomware Attacks on Financial Institutions:
2024
2025
increase
Q1 2026
increase over Q1 2025
2. Vendor Risk Is a Sector-Wide Threat
One vendor breach can compromise an entire national financial sector. In September 2025, Qilin's compromise of a single South Korean MSP cascaded into 32 financial institutions and over 2 terabytes of stolen data, making South Korea the second-most-targeted country for finance ransomware that year.
vendor breached
financial institutions impacted
terabytes of stolen data
3. A Reorganized Threat Ecosystem
The dismantlement of major ransomware groups did not reduce the threat, it rerouted it. Operators from disrupted groups have rebuilt under new banners, and emerging actors such as Qilin, Akira, and Kill Security have rapidly filled the vacuum, with Qilin alone responsible for 59 finance-sector incidents in the past year.
Ransomware group
victims in financial services
4. Vendor Vulnerabilities Multiply
Critical weaknesses across the vendor ecosystem serving finance have grown sharply in a single year. The number of vendors carrying CVEs with a CVSS score of 9 or higher rose from 15 to 73, across the 140 vendors most concentrated in finance, and those exposed to vulnerabilities with a CVSS of 8 or higher nearly tripled, moving from 31 to 87.
Vendors with Critical CVEs
2024
2025
increase
Vendors with High CVEs
2024
2025
increase
5. Active Exploitation at Scale
Vendor exposure is no longer theoretical. More than half of Black Kite's 140-vendor sample, 76 in total, carry at least one vulnerability listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. These are vulnerabilities actively weaponized in real-world attacks.
Vendors with Exploited Vulnerabilities
6. The Most Common Weaknesses Are the Most Preventable
The two most widespread weaknesses across vendors serving finance are also among the easiest to address. Critical-level patch management failures are present in 109 of the 140 vendors, more than any other control measured, and the same exposure spans 50.2% across the wider Black Kite ecosystem of more than 17,000 finance-related vendors.
Misconfigured email authentication shows the same gradient: 47 of the 140 vendors operate with misconfigured DMARC records and 37 with misconfigured DKIM
Vendors with Patch Management Failures
Vendors with Misconfigured DMARC Records
Vendors with Misconfigured DKIM Records

TABLE OF CONTENTS

01 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ransomware and Supply Chain Risk in Financial Services

02 | RANSOMWARE TRENDS
Ransomware Attack Trends in the Financial Sector

03 | THIRD-PARTY RISK
The Other Front: Third-Party Risk, Topline Metrics

04 | CASE STUDY 1
Korean Leaks: One MSP, 32 Financial Firms

05 | VENDOR POSTURE
The Anatomy of Vendor Risk in Finance: Control-Level Findings

06 | CASE STUDY 2
Marquis Software: One Vendor, 74+ Financial Institutions

07 | NEXT STEPS
Vendor Risk Is Preventable
The financial sector faced a brief reprieve from ransomware in 2024, but it didn't last.
The next section breaks down exactly how and why attacks rebounded.